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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 03-3733
____________
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
DONALD DRUMHELLER;
GINGER KATZENMOYER,
               Appellants
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 02-cv-07411)
District Judge:  Honorable Anita B. Brody
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 17, 2004
Before:  ALITO, AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 30, 2004)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Donald Drumheller, who owned an Allstate Insurance Co. (“Allstate”)
homeowners policy, appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Allstate. 
2Allstate had instituted a declaratory judgment action to determine its duties in conjunction
with a negligence action filed against Drumheller by a passenger injured in an accident
involving Drumheller and his All-Terrain Vehicle (“ATV”).
The factual background of this action was thoroughly discussed by the District
Court, and is known to the parties.  The District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of Allstate on the grounds that (1) the trail on which the accident occurred was not
“used in connection with [Drumheller’s] residence premises,” (2) the term “insured
premises” as defined in the policy is not ambiguous, and (3) Drumheller had no
reasonable expectation that the accident was covered under his policy.  On appeal,
Drumheller assigned error to each of these grounds.
In this diversity case, the Court must apply Pennsylvania law.  See Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).  In the interim between the grant of
summary judgment for Allstate and the submission date of this appeal, the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania decided State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. MacDonald, 850 A.2d 707
(May 11, 2004).  In MacDonald, the Superior Court found that a homeowners policy
provided liability coverage for the death of a visitor using an ATV on a field adjacent to
the insured property.  At issue was the interpretation of a “residence premises” provision
similar to the one involved here.
In Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941) (footnote
omitted), the Supreme Court held that “until such time as a case is no longer sub judice,
3the duty rests upon federal courts to apply state law under the Rules of Decision statute in
accordance with the then controlling decision of the highest state court.”  The Supreme
Court explicitly recognized in Vandenbark that the result of this rule would be that
“[i]ntervening and conflicting [state court] decisions will thus cause the reversal of
judgments which were correct when entered.”  Id.  We have long followed this rule.  See
Baker v. Outboard Marine Corp., 595 F.2d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1979) (reversing denial of
motion for new trial and remanding where intervening decision of state supreme court
rendered the jury charge erroneous); Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Co., 25 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1994) (vacating that portion of the
district court’s order allocating defense and indemnity costs and remanding where
intervening decision of state supreme court altered the statement of law relied upon by the
district court in its allocation).  Accordingly, we find it appropriate to VACATE the
decision below and REMAND for consideration of the impact, if any, of the MacDonald
decision.
________________________
